Should the events leading up to the Iraq War be considered an intelligence failure?

p Should the events leading up to the Iraq War be considered an intelligence failure ? Intelligence Failure and the Iraq War Although ambiguity persists in the public perception of the contribution of the United States intelligence services to the build up toward the Iraqi War , official statements by high-ranking intelligence officials who served during the time period in question maintain a specific position : that the U .S . possessed credible information that Iraq maintained an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and these weapons posed a potential threat to America . In point of

fact when classified intelligence reports surfaced in 2002 which seemed to indicate that " the United States had no reliable evidence before hostilities that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction "Official Rebuts Story of " 2003 ,

. A03 , Adm . Lowell Jacoby , the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency was quick to contradict this supposition stating for the record that the leaked report "didn 't mean Iraq 's banned weapons program was a myth "Official Rebuts Story of " 2003 ,

. A03 Whether or not the leaked DIA report of 2002 , in fact , indicates that the intelligence agency realized Iraq posed no threat to the U .S . or whether Adm . Lowell 's assertion , along with myriad others ' during the build-up to war , that Iraq did pose a threat to the U .S , the incontrovertible fact is that no weapons of significance were discovered post-invasion

The question as to whether or not the war can be considered a fall-out of "bad intelligence " then...