The World Food System

Running head : World Food System

World Food System

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Introduction

Attempting any global assessment immediately raises questions as to how the world should be divided up . There are obvious limitations in treating humanity as a single unit . The seven world regions derive directly from the standard United Nations regional classification of countries which was holding in 1992 , and which groups together the nations of the former Soviet Union (FSU . The regions are broadly homogeneous in terms of

their demographic , cultural , economic and agricultural characteristics although inevitably there is also very significant variation within each region

Sub-Saharan Africa consists of all countries in Africa except those in northern Africa . So , as defined here , sub-Saharan Africa includes South Africa . This region contained about 9 per cent of the world 's population in 1990 . The Middle East refers collectively to all countries in northern Africa and western Asia , stretching from the Arabian peninsular in the east to Morocco in the west . This region includes both Sudan and Turkey . Demographically the Middle East is the smallest of our seven regions , containing only about 5 per cent of humanity in 1990 . The next region is Soudi Asia , which contains nearly a quarter of humankind . It comprises the countries of the Indian subcontinent , plus Iran . India is the most important of these countries-with about 71 per cent of the region 's of our regional groupings and it is also one of the most diverse . This region covers all countries in eastern Asia (including Japan ) and south-eastern Asia . China alone contains one-fifth of humanity-64 per cent of the America , comprises all countries in the Caribbean and South and Central America , including Mexico . In 1990 Latin America contained about 8 per cent of the world 's population (Gilland , 1993

There is widespread , if not universal , agreement that today several hundred million people probably don 't have enough food to eat-and that most of these people live in Africa and Asia

However , in trying to go beyond this simple statement the problem immediately arises as to the criteria to be used in defining people as inadequately fed . This problem was illustrated by the socalled 'great protein fiasco ' of the 1960s and 1970s when a UN expert committee set unrealistically high standards to define adequate protein intake . The subsequent amendment of these standards led to a significant downward revision of the number of people considered to be suffering from insufficient protein consumption . The general view which now prevails is that most diets which provide sufficient food energy-i .e . calorie-intake probably also provide enough protein , although young growing children and pregnant and lactating women , may have additional protein requirements . Also some traditional diets based upon root and tuber crops (e .g . cassava , potatoes-yams ) may provide enough food energy , but not enough protein

However , to reiterate , the world food problem today is primarily defined in terms of dietary energy deficiency , or undernutrition . This constitutes the principal criterion for a modern definition of 'hunger We have already seen that cereals are the most important single element in the human diet . And in this context it is significant that , in addition to their calorie content , all cereals contain significant quantities of protein , albeit of variable quality (Barnett , Payne Steiner , 1995

Only a few countries conduct systematic and nationally representative surveys of food consumption which enable direct assessments of calorie intake to be made . So the most widely cited estimates of food energy intake and the prevalence of undernutrition are produced by FAO using various indirect procedures . For each country estimates are made of the period . This involves assembling data on national food production , trade and aid , and then making deductions for quantities of food which are lost in storage , fed to animals or used as seed . Next food composition factors are used to convert the food availability estimates into calorie equivalents . And , using population national estimates of per capita daily calorie supply

Diets based upon root and tuber crops are found in many specific locations , for example parts of the Pacific and the Andes in South America . But the main areas where such crops still seem to predominate in national diets are in central and west Africa

Of course , quantities of vitamins and minerals are required for an adequate diet . Thus one FAO definition of malnutrition is 'a pathological state , general or specific , resulting from a relative or absolute deficiency or an excess in the diet of one or more essential nutrients . Clearly , this definition can pertain to calories , proteins vitamins and minerals (Dyson Maharatna , 1992

Because food is never distributed equally between all households in a country-the rich typically getting more than average , and the poor typically getting less-FAO then attempts to estimate the distribution of calorie supplies within each national population , using various statistical procedures and assumptions , and whatever information on patterns of household income or expenditure may be at hand

But perhaps the most contentious step in FAO 's process of gauging the extent of undernutrition is that of estimating national per capita calorie requirements . This involves estimating the basal metabolic rate (BMR ) for each country-i .e . the number of calories required for an average person to maintain essential body functions , while lying at complete rest-taking account of variation in factors like national bodyweights and population age composition . Levels of calorie requirements are obtained by multiplying the BMRs by a constant . The value of this constant has been repeatedly revised upwards with time which , other things being equal , increases the number of people estimated as undernourished . Finally , comparison of the estimated calorie requirements with the estimated levels and distributions of calorie supplies provides estimates of the numbers of undernourished people (Ehrlich Ehrlich , 1990

Clearly , such a complicated and indirect approach , embodying a host of assumptions , and ultimately being based upon rather patchy empirical foundations , is far from ideal ! Quite minor changes to the methods and assumptions can produce very large differences to the estimated numbers of undernourished people . And it is not inconceivable that an organization which is devoted to food and agricultural production may have an interest in presenting estimates of global hunger which err on the high side

Food is a full of opposites . Nearly everyone has views . There can be times of feast , and times of famine . Some see human hunger as primarily a problem of production , while others emphasize issues of distribution . There are those who advocate national self-sufficiency in food , and those who favour policies of unrestricted free trade . Many people regard low food prices as a boon , but most farmers want higher prices . Usually there is some merit in both opposing views . Usually reality and sense rest somewhere in between

Hunger and food insecurity are widespread in the modern world Sub-Saharan Africa suffers chronically from both phenomena . But South Asia probably contains the greatest number of hungry people . Levels of per capita food availability are somewhat higher in the Far East , yet there is still much hunger there , and levels of national food security in the region are generally low . In the Middle East relatively high levels of average food availability often belie the extent of food insecurity-and this region is already singularly dependent upon imported food . Even Latin America-with its relatively rich agricultural resource base-confronts serious food problems (Anderson Tyers , 1991

However , while population growth certainly sometimes adds to the task of raising levels of per capita food production (and consumption , it is not the principal cause of contemporary world hunger . It is important to remember that , until relatively recently in human history 'hunger (at least as we would define it today ) has probably been the lot of most people , in most places , at most times

Moreover , we have seen that in recent years and decades food production has generally grown faster than population . It is true that world grain output has fallen behind demographic growth since 1984 . But the reason for this lies largely in the rich world 's overproduction of cereals compared to the quantities which could reasonably be sold (even at heavily subsidized prices ) or otherwise dispensed . Very low selling prices discouraged many of the world 's farmers from growing grain Deliberate curbs on cereal production - especially , but not exclusively in North America-constitute a large part of the explanation for the fall in global per capita cereal output since the early 1980s

Only in sub-Saharan Africa do we find credible evidence that cereal (and to a lesser extent food ) output has failed to keep abreast of population growth , partly because of the speed and volume of that growth itself (Basu , 1984

But in all other world regions food production has kept ahead of population increase . Since the early 1980s farmers have often switched out of cereals towards more remunerative food (and non-food ) crops Diets have generally become more diverse . Recent progress in raising per capita food production has been-and continues to be-greatest in the world 's two most populous regions , i .e . the Far East and South Asia Moreover , the expansion of global trade in food means that inter-regional transfers now play an increasing role in moderating changes in per capita food consumption . Even sub-Saharan Africa has had its dismal recent food production performance significantly offset by increased food transfers from outside

So , several pivotal neo-Malthusian assertions regarding the relationship between population and food during the recent past can be firmly rejected . In turn , this makes it easier for us to construct a more tolerable-if far from perfect-vision of the future

The average level of world per capita food production (and consumption in the year 2020 will probably be fairly similar to the level which applied around 1990 . However , as we have repeatedly stressed , this will be entirely compatible with rises in per capita food consumption in most regions . Virtually all of the increase in world population in the period to 2020 will occur in regions with lower levels of per capita food consumption . Other things being equal , over time this will tend to bias downwards any simple (and therefore rather misleading ) measure of global per capita food availability

As we have seen , demographic growth has become the increasingly predominant cause of the expansion of world food production . This trend will continue . Using cereals as a rough proxy for food in general , it is reasonable to expect that between 80 and 90 per cent of the rise in world food output over the period to 2020 will be due to increased demand generated by population growth (Ehrlich , 1968

Our judgment is that general demographic , socio-economic and political conditions in sub-Saharan Africa may be so difficult that there will be little change-perhaps even some deterioration-in average levels of per capita food consumption there . Given no unforeseen huge calamity , the world 's farmers will certainly be able to meet this volume of demand . To do so the average global cereal yield will have to reach about 4 tons per hectare-a feasible target on the assumption of a continuing linear trend . There may also have to be a modest expansion of the world 's harvested cereal area-through some mixture of increased multiple cropping , reduced set aside and cultivation of new land

World agriculture will certainly see a steady rise in fertilizer use . By 2020 global applications of synthetic nitrogen will probably have doubled . The world 's irrigated area will also continue to expand-especially in the Far East and South Asia . Global irrigation capacity in 2020 will still be well above 40 hectares per thousand population . And , of course , there will be further new varieties of food crops with higher yields

In the future , as in the past , a multitude of other factors will interact to raise world agricultural productivity . But , in particular we can expect that there will be greater and greater emphasis upon information-intensive farm management procedures . The decisions of farmers across a whole range of issues- e .g . water use , soil quality nitrogen up-take-will become increasingly tailored to the requirements of individual fields . For example , sometimes this will involve detailed study of high-resolution satellite photographs other times farmers will be better interpreting subtle differences and changes in the colors of their food crop leaves

Returning to the regional level of analysis , it appears inevitable that there will be a growing future mismatch between the expansion of food demand and food supply . Inevitably , therefore , the international trade in food will greatly increase . The world seems set to have two major food exporting blocs (recall that for most of the period since the Second World War there has been only one . The recent rivalry between the traditional cereal exporters of North America and the EU will continue (being eventually joined and complicated by countries in eastern Europe and the FSU . Notwithstanding GATT agreements and the existence of the World Trade Organization , we can confidently expect many more agricultural trade wrangles between these two exporting blocs in the coming years ! A major , long-term rise in world food prices might ease this rivalry . The issue of future price movements is hard to fathom . But the last hundred years of generally falling international grain prices suggest that such a sustained price rise is unlikely to occur (Gastil , 1989

Turning to the food importing regions , with the possible exception of Latin America , they will all be significantly more dependent upon imports to meet their 2020 food requirements (in both absolute and proportional terms ) than was the case in 1990 . The Middle East could be importing half its from the Far East (particularly China ) will certainly be very large-amounting to perhaps 13 to 23 per cent of its But it seems likely that South Asia will be much less reliant upon imports than the Far East . It is our expectation that most countries in most regions will be able to finance most of their imports . But this may not be true for subSaharan Africa-which by 2020 may need to import a quarter or more of its current levels of per capita consumption

It is worth remarking that this broad forecast envisages that roughly two-thirds of the increase in global cereal production in the period to 2020 will occur in the predominantly developing , food importing , world regions themselves . Thus , for example , when people ask 'Who will feed China ' the answer is plain 'Mostly , the Chinese . But so far as export capacity is concerned , it is obvious that the two most developed regions (essentially North America and Europe ) enjoy the best of any prevailing 'comparative advantage '-given their supplies of cropland , their agricultural systems and their associated industries

The issue then arises as to the basis , and extent , of these future transfers . Some sub-Saharan countries will be able to finance imports But it seems probable that other countries will become more dependent upon supplies of food aid provided mainly for humanitarian reasons Perhaps bargains will be struck whereby environmental conservation (and other ) programs are instigated partly in exchange for food . But there must be a chance that food transfers into the region will not expand at the envisaged rate , and , therefore , that sub-Saharan Africa 's already meagre levels of per capita food consumption will decline

Then there is the issue of the i .e . the number of undernourished people there will be . The foregoing broad forecast anticipates that average levels of food availability will remain approximately constant in sub-Saharan Africa and the two most developed world regions , but that there will be modest rises in per capita consumption in the Middle East , South Asia , Latin America and the Far East . However , without addressing the knotty issue of future trends in income (and therefore food ) distribution , it is impossible to say whether there will be fewer (or more ) undernourished people alive in 2020 than was the case in 1990

Looking at sub-Saharan Africa , the Far East and South Asia , there are already signs that many poor people are worse off in terms of their food availability and food security-precisely because of recent measures of economic 'liberalization . One problem with evaluating food issues is that many different criteria can be employed . Thus average levels of per capita food consumption can increase simultaneously with the numbers of hungry people . Or to give another example , in terms of its future import requirements South Asia 's prospects may appear to be significantly better than those of the Far East-because the former region will probably import considerably less food . But these 'better ' prospects will partly result from much lower average levels of future food consumption

Another important proviso relates to variability . These are the two world regions which are most dependent upon rainfed agriculture . And in both cases the basic explanation for the rising trend is more frequent drought . These disturbing developments may continue or , at least , they may not retreat . For sub-Saharan Africa this could constitute yet another deteriorating circumstance . The most significant effect of more drought in North America / Oceania may operate through greater international grain price volatility-in a world in which many poor countries are increasingly dependent upon cereal imports (Kutzner 1991

This said , it should be recalled that in most world regions there are no signs of a trend towards greater harvest variability (despite the fact that it is sometimes contended that rising yields are inherently less stable . This point of reassurance applies to the world 's second potential major food exporting bloc of Europe / FSU . So one 's views as to how much of a problem heightened harvest variability may be in the next few decades must be mixed . We certainly cannot entirely preclude a repeat of the ENSO-inspired droughts which occurred in 1972-74 . But humanity 's capacity to deal with any future crisis should also be somewhat improved

Unless the global climate really does go awry during the period to 2020 in most world regions it is hard to see drought , by itself , causing famine-as it virtually did , for example , in several parts of Asia around 1972-74 . But , again , sub-Saharan Africa could be a different story . In any case , for many countries in this region we assess overall levels of national food security (including a sociopolitical component ) to be so low as to virtually ensure the continuation of periodic food crises in sub-Saharan Africa

The coming quarter century will certainly have its surprises (perhaps the best would be if circumstances in sub-Saharan Africa genuinely improved . But on the issue of the relationship between world population growth and food supplies it is hard to envisage that the situation will get very much worse in the way that some neo-Malthusians evidently suppose

Despite these caveats , there is fair reason to expect that in the year 2020 world agriculture will be feeding the larger global population no worse-and probably a little better-than it manages to do today . This all adds up to tempered hope

Obviously the task won 't be easy (it has not been easy in the past . For most poor countries we can firmly reject any optimistic notion that their demographic growth alone will somehow spontaneously generate commensurate increases in food production . Population growth may be a slow-acting process , the independent effects of which are sometimes hard to isolate in statistical analyses . But there can be no doubt at all that contemporary world population growth is making the task of satisfactorily feeding humanity significantly harder to accomplish than it would otherwise be . And population growth is going to be the paramount cause of increased food production in the coming decades-a fact with countless ramifications (Allan , 1995

On the other hand , we have also seen that the modern neo-Malthusian case suffers from major questions of credibility . Pronouncements from this quarter are often deceptively simple and have to be read with very great care . There can be problems of selectivity and representation . Moreover these problems of credibility are not confined to a neo-Malthusian core but are sometimes displayed by representatives of mainstream agencies concerned with world food issues

Simple claims and soundbites are doubtless easy to convey . And in most years it is usually possible to represent some of 'last year 's statistics in a disturbing light . But the relationship between population and food is complex . Indeed , one major reason for tempered hope regarding humanity 's prospects to 2020 derives precisely from this very complexity . A host of factors intervene between population and food to provide a measure of flexibility and adaptability

Reference

Allan , T (1995 'The political economy of Jordan catchment water , in J .A . Allan and J .H .O . Court (eds ) Water in the Jordan Catchment Countries , SOAS Water Issues Group , London : School of Oriental and African Studies

Anderson , K . and Tyers , R (1991 ) Global Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Farm Products , London : Harvester-Wheatsheaf

Barnett , V , Payne , R . and Steiner , R (eds (1995 ) Agricultural Sustainability : Economic , Environmental and Statistical

Considerations , Chichester : John Wiley . Basu , D .R (1984 'Food policy and the analysis of famine , Indian Journal of Economics 64 254 :289-301

Dyson , T . and Maharatna , A (1992 'Bihar famine , 1966-67 , and Maharashtra drought , 1970-73 : The demographic consequences

Economic and Political Weekly 27 , 26 :1325-32

Ehrlich ,

.R (1968 ) The Population Bomb , New York : Ballantine Books . Ehrlich ,

.R . and Ehrlich , A .H (1990 ) The Population Explosion , New York : Simon B . Schuster

Gastil , R (ed (1989 ) Freedom in the World 1988-89 , New York : Freedom House

Gilland , B (1993 'Cereals , nitrogen and population : An assessment of the global trends , Endeavour , New Series 17 , 2 :84-8

Kutzner ,

.L (1991 ) World Hunger , A Reference Handbook , Santa Barbara and Oxford : ABC-CLIO

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