Why did Japan-Soviet relations fail to improve significantly during the superpower detente of the 1970s?

Running Head : Japan-Soviet Relations in 1970s

Japan-Soviet Relations in 1970s

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Russian-Japan Relationship : An Introduction

Japan and Russia are only among the major combatants in World War II that have failed to sign a peace treaty fully normalizing their relations . The immediate cause of this strained relation is the inability of Tokyo and Moscow to agree on the ownership of the Kurile Islands , which the Soviet Union captured and occupied in the closing days of the war . This Soviets stance was maintained by their Russian

br successors which claimed that it was in agreement with their then ally the United States , at the February 1945 Yalta Conference , the decisions of which Japan later accepted . In the Russian view , Japan as a result has no basis for challenging Russian control over the islands . The Japanese , on the other hand , argue that although they surrendered the Kuriles in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty , these do not include the four southernmost islands namely Etorofu , Kunashiri , Shikotan , and Habomai which are an extension of nearby Hokkaido and therefore part of Japan . Tokyo therefore claims that these Northern Territories are unlawfully occupied by Russia and must be returned . The United States ostensibly supports Japan 's position however it did not begin to do so until the1950s when the escalation of the Cold War made it necessary to strengthen Japanese support for the U .S .-Japan alliance

Despite the fact that few Japanese know or care very much about the unproductive and fog-shrouded islands that comprise the Northern Territories , these unappealing pieces of real estate carry symbolic associations that matter a great deal to the many . For Japanese , the islands call to mind memories of what they consider as an unjustified Russian stab in the back ' at a moment of their national weakness provoked by little more than revenge and territorial enlargement Japanese images of the Russo-Japanese War ' of August 1945 , fleeing Japanese civilians being massacred in Korea and Manchuria , and hundreds of thousands of surrendering Japanese soldiers being marched off to Soviet gulags have faded over the years , but not completely disappeared Similarly they understand that the Soviet assault on the southern Kuriles began after Japan 's surrender on August 15 and continued even after the formal surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay on September 2 Therefore these islands are symbols of national prestige and honor for the Japanese

The Russians , evidently , hold quite different views on the Soviet attack on Japan and seizure of the Kuriles . From their standpoint , these actions were part of the Great Patriotic War ' against Nazism and fascism . Despite the fact that Japan concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in 1941 and played no part in the European war , it was an ally of Nazi Germany and a dangerously anticommunist fascist state It was , in addition , an expansionist one that threatened the Soviet Far East . Japan tried to capture this region in 1918-21 Siberian Intervention , and these military quests across the Manchurian b resulted in an undeclared Soviet -Japanese war in 1939 . Considered from this perspective , the Soviet strike against Japan in 1945 was a lawful act of self- defense against a still dangerous fascist aggressor Furthermore , whatever Stalin 's reasons for taking the Kuriles probably their strategic value in guarding the approaches to the Sea of Okhots Russia 's historical claim to the islands is in any case as strong as Japan 's

The events of 1945 stepped up a relationship of rivalry and enmity that stretches back into the nineteenth century and forward to the present In the early 1800s , Japan 's northern blands viz . the Kuriles Sakhalin , and Hokkaido formed a tempting target for Russian expansion as they were unprotected and populated by non-Japanese hunter-fishers The Japanese never occupied these areas or attempted to establish its sovereignty over them . Conflicting territorial claims , punctuated by clashes and shows of force , led to an 1875 treaty that gave Sakhalin to Russia and the Kuriles to Japan . This , nevertheless , was not a wholly satisfactory arrangement to either side . Nor did it end Russo-Japanese enmity , which shifted in the 1890s and early 1900s to control over Korea and Manchuria . Their military confrontation in the war of 1904-5 fought mainly in Manchuria , resulted in a Japanese victory , although at a heavy cost in Japanese lives and treasure . As part of the peace settlement , Tokyo demanded and got back southern Sakahlin , which it had never been reconciled to giving up in 1875

The Russo-Japanese war brought only a cautious truce between Japan and Russia . The Japanese consolidated its influence in southern Manchuria and prepared for an expected war of revenge ' by the Russians . The Russians withdrew to northern Manchuria and hoped of regaining their lost holdings in the south , particularly the strategic naval base of Port Arthur and South Sakhalin . For about a decade (1907-17 , the two sides set aside their hostility to cooperate in developing Manchuria and , as nominal allies in World War I , fighting Germany . However this relative peace broke down with the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917 and the ensuing Russian civil war . Japan took advantage of the Allied Siberian Intervention as an opportunity to to establish anticommunist client states in Siberia and the Russian Far East However , the rise of Soviet power in the late 1920s and 1930s threatened Japan with an obstinate ideological foe and a new threat to its Manchurian lifeline ' Until 1941 , a military strike against the Soviet Far East was high on Japan 's list of strategic options and was favored by many army leaders

Despite of the fact Stalin did not start the war against Japan in 1945 it was improbable that postwar Soviet-Japanese relations would have prospered . When Japan 's wartime leaders faced defeat in 1944-45 , their greatest fear next to national humiliation was Japan 's Sovietization This fear carried was compounded by the rise of the Japanese left with pro- Soviet leanings . The threat , as seen by Japanese conservatives was less about communism itself than communism harnessed what seen as the long known belligerency of Russia . Dislike and mistrust of Soviet Russia ' survived the decline of the Japanese left in the 1970s , and were not restricted to the conservative elite . The Soviet Union constantly topped the list of least liked countries ' in opinion polls . The Soviets ' negative image was partly inspired by Cold War provocations and downing of a Korean airliner off northern Japan . This also reflected historical memories and myths about Russian behavior which had pre-Cold War roots . These negative images persisted even after the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of democratic Russia ' and up to present Russo-Japanese relations

The Northern Territories problem for Japanese is not the only inflexible territorial dispute in East Asia , and it is not a particularly dangerous one in terms of its potential to spark conflict . The Japanese government never tried or intended to free these islands by force or the threat of force . It has however kept the issue in the forefront of its bilateral dealings with Moscow , and mainted its claim to the islands and their return as the outcome of a peace treaty and improved relations

The first chance of a Russian-Japanese deal came in the near outcome of the San Francisco Peace Treaty . Formal talks for normalization were started by the Soviet Union in July 1954 . A peace treaty seemed within reach when in August 1955 Japan changed its position from claiming all four islands to allowing for a gradual settlement based on the return of Shikotan and Habomai . Discussions surrounding the outcome of islands failed as a result of Cold War politics and U .S . intervention , in which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu that any concessions to their Cold War rival by Japan could lead to the permanent occupation of Okinawa by American troops

In a note to the Soviet Union in 1957 , the U .S . supported Japan 's disagreement that the claims renounced in the SFPT did not include the Northern Territories . From then on , Japan could only claim all four islands

The Dulles threat ' hypothesis gains importance as the American decision-makers take turnaround regarding the Kurile Islands . In a secret agreement at Yalta in February 1945 , Roosevelt agreed to grant the rights to Kuriles to Stalin in return for entering the Pacific War disregarding the State Department 's briefing s which rejected Soviet claims to the four islands as unfounded . It was agreed that the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union ' and that the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union . The different wording was used to reflect the fact that the four islands had been under Japanese sovereign control since the Shimoda Treaty was signed in 1855 to set the b between Etorofu and Urup islands in the Kurile chain . Following the Russo-Japanese War , Japan gained control of the southern half of Sakhalin , whose territorial rights it had relinquished in the 1875 Treaty of St . Petersburg

During the final stages of World War II , the U .S . Joint Chiefs of Staffs were indecisive about how Kurile Islands were to be incorporated into their postwar plans on am unexpected conclusion of the war . Initially Truman rejected Stalin 's request for a zone of occupation on Hokkaido however later agreed to his demand over the Kuriles (Mendl ,

.179 ) It was generally believed the Truman administration consider Kunashiri and Etorofu as part of the Kuriles , the Habomais and Shikotan were not (Gallicchio ,

. 88-95 ) This view was confirmed by John Allison , the American Ambassador to Japan , when he informed Japanese officials that the U .S . supported Tokyo 's claims to Habomai and Shikotan however it would be legally difficult for the United States to support a Japanese claim to all or part of the Kuriles ' The U .S . quickly changed its opinion in August 1956 , when Japan was about to make a rapprochement with the Soviet Union . As public opinion in Japan criticized American intervention in the Soviet-Japanese normalization process , the Japanese government requested the official U .S . view regarding the Northern Territories . The reply from Washington was after a careful examination of the historical facts ' the U .S . concluded that all four islands had always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty (U .S . Department of State Bulletin XXXV , 1956 , cited in Gallicchio 1991 : 98 ) Then , Prime Minister Hatoyama in all probability decided that it was not worth risking either the loss of Okinawa or American annoyance for the mere possibility of normalized relations with the Soviet Union

In the post-Cold War era , the failure to achieve political compromise between Japan and Russia is largely attributed to misperception and decision-making failures . The implication drawn from existing individual case studies is that accidental factors such as miscalculations , bad timing , and lack of leadership , and clumsy diplomatic skills ' led to collapse of talks despite favorable conditions

The settlement of the territorial issue holds attractions for both sides . For the Japanese , it was matter of embarrassing legacy of World War II . In the view of many , an agreement would also make possible their access to the rich natural resources of Siberia and the Russian Far East . For the Russians , an improved relation with Japan may result in attracting Japanese capital and technology to develop their eastern territories and integrate them with the dynamic East Asian economic region . It may also strengthen the hand of Moscow and Tokyo in dealing with a rising China

Although a settlement on the Northern Territories might appear to be in the mutual interest of Russia and Japan , has been in the offing During the Cold War , the issue was insignificant as Japan was considered a subordinate player . Stalin refused to discuss the status of the islands however Khrushchev , hoping to weaken the Japanese-American alliance , offered to return the two smallest ones (Shikotan and Habomai after the conclusion of a peace treaty . The Japanese were tempted however Washington wrecked the deal before it could be struck and Khrushchev later withdrew his offer in 1960 . The one positive aspect of this step was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Moscow and Tokyo in 1956

Russian-Japan Relationship : A Literature Review

A number of works on Japanese-Soviet relationships were published during the Cold War among the most prominent in English were Herbet Feis Contest over Japan (1968 , Savitri Vishwanathan 's Normalization of Soviet-Japanese Relations , 1945-1970 : An Indian View (1973 , Young C Kim 's Japanese-Soviet Relations : Instruction of Politics , Economics and National Security (1974 . All of these books are commendable in many respects however they lacked limited sources and comprehensiveness Moreover , they have a narrow focus on the Northern Territories dispute

The Carter years of 1977 to 1981 saw pseudo-detente worldwide following the fall of Saigon to communist forces in 1975 , as did Cambodia and Laos later . This marked the end of U .S . military involvement in Indochina Therefore , it is important to analyze the territorial issues in Japanese-Soviet relations in the context of new developments

According to a Russian diplomat , territorial disputes and indistinct bs are typical of Asian international relations : There are no established general principles for settlement or even handling of territorial disputes in the region ' He adds : Although the origins of the various territorial or b disputes in the Asia-Pacific region are quite different , all of them appear quite intractable ' The fact is that often times the territories in dispute are small and rather unimportant pieces of rock , in the cases of Kurile Islands /Northern Territories claimed by both Russia and Japan , Tokdo /Takeshima claimed by South Korea and Japan , Senkaku /Diaoyu Island claimed by Japan and China and the Spratlys claimed by China and six other Southeast Asian countries . This has prompted a question whether the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands

The supposed link between Russia 's different territorial disputes has been underlined by Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova , who assert that

`The Kuriles were the last straw for Russians , whose national pride was already wounded . With the Kuriles , they were compensating for what they had lost in the Caucasus , Central Asia , the Baltic , and Ukraine-getting their emotional revenge for their national humiliation

Hasegawa writes that the dispute between the Northern Territories was the main reason for the lack of progress in Soviet-Japanese relations particularly in concluding a peace treaty that officially ended the state of war between the two countries

In accordance with successive Japanese governments , the Northern Territories are and always have been Japanese territories , unlawfully seized by the Soviet Union after World War II had ended , as part of an arrangement Yalta ) that their rightful owner was not a part of . The Soviet counterpoint is that Japan 's actions in World War II violated the 1855 , 1875 and 1905 treaties , and their seizure of the Kuriles was a price for Japanese aggression against Russian and Soviet territory

Rather than placing the blame over the Northern Territories evenly on the either Russia or Japan , Hasegawa claims both sides missed chances to resolve the conflict , and consequently its objectives . The egotism clumsiness and inflexibility by the Soviets over the Northern Territories created deep anger among most Japanese during the Cold War over the issue , and made it easy for the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP ) to push for a close security arrangement with the United States , and eventually , rapprochement with China (Hasegawa , Vol 1 ,

br 172

An important example of this mistaken policy that Hasegawa points to is the Soviet Union 's rejection to sign the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 in which Japan formally relinquished claim to the Northern Territories to the Soviet Union . Had the Soviets signed it , this would have removed any later Japanese claims for the islands . However , blinded by the unreal prospect (at that time ) of a Japanese-American military alliance that would be used to attack the Soviet Union , they refused . In doing so , they laid the foundation for one of the longest-standing disputes of the Cold War (Hasegawa , Vol 1 ,

. 101 . Hasegawa admits that this outcome was planned by the State Department of the United States , and particularly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to drive a wedge between the USSR and Japan , and this outcome could have been nullified by a Soviet decision to approve the treaty (Hasegawa , Vol 1 ,

. 105

Hasegawa however does not wholly absolve Japan for the continuation of the Northern Territories dispute . He acknowledges that the seizure of the Kuriles shows that the USSR acquired the Northern Territories unlawfully he states that the Japanese government used the memory of "victimization " by the Soviet Union to validate a close relationship with the United States (Hasegawa , Vol 1 ,

. 172 . Inflexible in their national pride , the Japanese failed to recognize that if the Soviet Union recognized Japanese claims to the Kuriles , would open up a flood of irredentist demands for lost territory from other countries Moreover the islands ' strategic position at the access to the Pacific Ocean , made them too valuable to the Soviet Union to be given up for nothing . Japan 's policy of demanding a return of the islands , made it practically impossible for the Soviet Union to agree to Japanese terms (Hasegawa , Vol 1 ,

.171

Hasegawa also hold responsible to both Gorbachev and his Japanese to make progress on any of these issues . Gorbachev failed to offer anything in return for Japanese assistance in trade and arms control concerning Northern Territories , while the Japanese remained stuck in an outdated Cold War attitude , refusing to work with the USSR to create greater stability in the Far East

Like Hasegawa , Kimie Hara acknowledges the Northern Territories dispute as a major cause of friction between the USSR and Japan during the Cold War . According to Hara , the United States created the dispute over the Northern Territories . It was the United States that used the Kuriles as a way to get Stalin into the war against Japan at Yalta , and later to drive a wedge between the USSR and Japan through the ambiguous definition in the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Hara ,

. 33 . This "by-product " of the Cold War , as Hara terms , remained the issue that obstructed chances for the full normalization of relations between the Soviets and the Japanese . Hara claimed that the United States , while supporting Japan 's claim right to the Kuriles , intentionally intended to continue the dispute as long as possible with the purpose of maintaining the security alliance with Japan (Hara ,

. 214

The continued dependence of Japan on the security alliance with the United States went against the expressed wishes of the Soviet Union This kept the issue from being resolved on which all other issues were dependant upon . The end results of this process were a series of failures at diplomatic summits and increased military tension during the late 1970s and early 1980s

Hara believes that the United States , looking to contain the Soviet Union , aggravated an already tense situation and only made the problem worse . In doing so , it led to a decrease , rather than an increase , in the stability of the Far East

Specialists in the Japanese /Soviet era , such as Kimie Hara and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa , see the San Francisco Peace Treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951 as a turning point in Soviet /Japanese relations Another study by Haruki Wada in "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Definition of the Kurile Islands ' is a further attempt to study the circumstances surrounding a key event in the diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Japan

Haruki Wada sees the main agent in the Soviet-Japanese dispute over the Kuriles was Washington . It was the United States , Wada claims , that tried to plan a peace agreement with Japan that determined the status of the southern Kuriles as Japanese , not Soviet territory . Despite the fact that the United States turned its back on this definition in 1949 the Japanese government hesitatingly adopted this policy in 1956 . In the next year , the United States agreed to this position to support Japan against the Soviet Union . According to Hara , this was "the logic of confrontation " that spoiled Japanese /Soviet relations throughout the Cold War

Wada also points to the pamphlets discussed by Kimie Hara , which show the Japanese Foreign Service office wished to define only Habomai and Shikotan as part of the Kuriles , not Etorofu and Kunashiri (Wada ,

br 17 . So , it was the United States who pushed the Japanese into claiming that the other two islands were not part of Kuriles . The United States could confirm a peace treaty with Japan in accordance with the promises of the Yalta accords , while at same time creating an obstruction to Soviet /Japanese Relations

Zagorsky writes that following Stalin 's death in 1953 , the Soviet Union tried to normalize relations with Japan by offering many concessions to Japan on the Northern Territories and in terms of security alliances and on the Northern Territories question . This in 1956 led to the normalization of relations between the two nations and the proclamation of a Joint Declaration . The Declaration stated that the islands of Shikotan and Habomai would be given to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty . Nevertheless , in 1960 , the Soviet Union changed its promises on concessions to Japan , and returned to their position pre-1956 of the Northern Territories , which they maintained for the rest of the Cold War

Zagorsky argues the result of the Soviet diplomacy with regards to Japan was to follow the "Adenauer formula " that is , to re-establish diplomatic relations while either ignoring or denying the existence of a territorial dispute (Zagorsky , pp . 59 . The decision to follow the Adenauer formula with regards to Japan was Khrushchev 's attempt to distinguish himself from the hard-line policy of his one remaining rival to succeed Stalin , Vyaschlev Molotov (Zagorsky ,

. 65 . After the ouster of Molotov , the Soviet leaders continued his policy of easing relations with Japan . In the meantime , the increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union over West Berlin , Cuba , and the U-2 incident forced Khrushchev to return to his hard-line stance in 1960 (Zagorsky ,

. 66

Conclusions

The Kurile Islands /Northern Territories dispute offers a motivating opportunity to empirically observe how Japan uses economic power to obtain its security objectives . The aim of this study was to reveal that Japan 's political economic strategy with reference to dispute is not an obvious failure

Conventional approaches to territorial disputes fail to reveal the influence means at work between the two contenders . Despite the fact that Japan has failed to buy ' the islands back from the Soviet Union recent attempts at general ' linkage designed to lure the Russian public in the form of economic aid , transportation and timber projects and technological transfers have met with partial success

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