Philosophy

The dispute whether the morality is in the eye of beholder or whether it is a matter-of-fact phenomenon has been held for decades and the ultimate solution has never been given . The problem is there are significant arguments in favour of both subjective and objective theory In the current I chose to prove that moral judgements are subjective by using the theory of moral emotion proposed by Professor Edward Westermarck . I 'm also going to see how he refutes the counterarguments offered by some of his opponents

Before going any further , it

is important to clear up what I take to mean to be objective ' and subjective ' to avoid ambiguity of the terms , which in itself has caused a long contention within the circle of meta-ethics philosophers . If we take the words objective ' and subjective ' in terms of their origin , we will see that they are different in their focus - the former has emphasis on the object whereas the latter concentrates on the subject . In other words , they point out to where the properties of all phenomena should be looked for In the first case the object is equal to itself , its properties being intrinsic and irrelevant of the perceiver . In the second case , however the properties for the given object lie beyond the object itself , it is the subject who generates the object 's properties by the mere fact of having a certain attitude towards it . However , one should be cautious not to substitute subjectivism for moral nihilism . Being subjective does not mean that it is impossible to tell right from wrong . Subjectivists do accept that moral judgements can be both right and wrong . The difference between subjective and objective lies in the fact that the former presupposes that value is something which was once ascribed to the object or action , whereas the latter assumes that being right or wrong belongs to the realm of inherent qualities . These are the meanings of subjective and objective I 'm going to refer to in the current

Speaking of Professor Westermarck 's theory , it is necessary to examine how he substantiates his claim that all moral concepts , which are used as predicates in moral judgments , are ultimately based on emotions . To make his point , he offers a certain classification of emotions , which are basically fall into two classes - moral and non-moral . In their turn , depending on the value , moral emotions are classified into moral approval and moral disapproval ones . They may thus , on the one hand be regarded as two distinct divisions of the moral emotions , whilst , on the other hand , moral disapproval , like anger and revenge , forms a subspecies of resentment , and approval , like gratitude , forms a subspecies of retributive kindly emotion (Westermarck , 1963 ) The philosopher claims that such division comes from the animal world , being necessary for the species survival , humans inclusive . Both of these emotions are useful to the species : by resentment evils are averted , by retributive kindliness benefits are secured

What is the difference then between moral emotions serving the basis for moral judgements and non-moral emotions ? A moral judgment always has the character of disinterestedness . When pronouncing an act good or bad , I mean that it is so quite independently of any reference it might have to me personally . If a person condemns an act which does him harm , how can he vindicate the moral nature of his judgment ? Only by pointing out that his condemnation is not due to the particular circumstance that it is he himself who is the sufferer , that his judgment would be the same if anybody else in similar circumstances had been the victim , in other words , that it is disinterested . Even the egoistic hedonist , who regards acts as good or bad according as they give pleasure or pain to the agent , recognizes disinterestedness as essential to a moral judgment , in so far as he holds the judgment applicable to all similar cases , whether he himself or some one else happens to be the agent . Now , if the moral concepts are generalizations of tendencies to feel moral emotions and at the same time contain the notion of disinterestedness , we must conclude that the emotions from which they spring are felt disinterestedly Westermarck , 1963 ) In other words , the same act done to an enemy and a friend is regarded equally good or bad irrespective of which of these people it was committed to . In this case we can speak of moral judgement . As Professor states , moral emotion , then , is tested by an imaginary change of the relationship between him who approves or disapproves of the mode of conduct by which the emotion was evoked and the parties immediately concerned , while the relationship between the parties themselves is left unaltered

However , from the statement about the emotional origin of ethical judgement it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that whenever the moral discourse takes place , it should be necessarily accompanied by the emotion it was initially allied to . In most cases this link falls out of the chain , which forms the mechanism of emotion judgement . But the absence of this link at the final stage does not deny the fact that in the course of moral evolution the value was attributed to certain objects on the basis of emotions of approval or disapproval . What is the outcome of this moral evolution then ? That 's what Westermarck writes about it : To attribute a quality to something is not the same as to state the existence of a particular emotion or sensation in the mind that perceives it . This , however , does not imply that the term used to denote the quality may not have a subjective origin . I maintain , on the contrary , that the qualities assigned to the subjects of moral judgments really are generalizations derived from approval or disapproval felt with regard to certain modes of conduct , that they are tendencies to feel one or the other of these emotions interpreted as qualities , as dynamic tendencies , in the phenomena which gave rise to the emotion . A similar translation of emotional states into terms of qualities assigned to external phenomena is found in many other cases : something is "fearful " because people fear it "admirable " because people admire it When we call an act good or bad , we do not state the existence of any emotional tendencies , any more than , when we call a landscape beautiful we state any characteristics of beauty : we refer the subject of the judgment to a class of phenomena which we are used to call good or bad But we are used to call them so because they have evoked moral approval or disapproval in ourselves or in other persons from whom we have learned the use of those words (Westermarck , 1963

The confusion with moral judgements is about the fact that they are not produced by the emotions of a concrete person who expresses them but reflects the ready-made values of one or another group , which are absorbed by the person as ready-made solutions . Moreover , what was once an object of moral emotion has turned into mere label of certain forms of conduct often digested by people with the language . This reminds of Orwell 's idea of close connection between existence of certain phenomena and words to label them . If , for example , the word `freedom ' is expelled from the language , it would be hard for a person to think about it without having a label for the concept . Besides , the context interferes No doubt , since "good " and "bad " can each be used in different senses "this is bad " may not always contradict "this is good " because , for example "good " may mean "instrumentally good " and "bad " may mean "intrinsically bad (Ewing , 1947 ) How is then this contradiction is solved ? There is no contradiction , Westermarck claims : We hear that some one has appropriated another 's property , this is theft , it is wrong some one tells an untruth , this is lying , it is wrong some one gives money to a needy person , this is charitable , it is good and so forth . But when we examine the nature of these acts we find that they are apt to give rise to or , as we may also put it , to become the objects of , certain emotions , either of disapproval or approval , and it is the tendency to feel one or the other of these emotions that has led people to call them bad or good . Those who first established the use of these and all other moral concepts felt disapproval or approval and expressed in the concepts their tendency to feel such an emotion in the given circumstances ( Westermarck ,1963

Of course , like most of meta-ethical theories , Westmarck 's conception of moral emotion presented one particular angle , from which the issue can be observed . That 's why it is natural that he was immediately challenged by his opponents , who proposed their counterarguments . Thus , Professor Sorley argues that if a value-judgment lacked that validity it assumes the proposition "this is good " could never be either true or false "it would only express some peculiar state of mind of the person making the assertion and would have no possible validity in itself-would be indeed , simply an emotion put by mistake into the form of a proposition (Sorley , 1924 ) That 's what Westermarck answers to his argument : I thought it was generally recognized that every proposition is either true or false , and that this must consequently be the case also with the proposition "this is good " whatever be the meaning of its predicate . But whether it is true or false just depends on the meaning given to it (Westermarck , 1963

Another argument was raised by Professor Moore as far as the theory of emotional origin of moral concepts . He argues that if one person says "this action is wrong " and another says of the very same action that it is not wrong , and each of them merely makes a judgment about his own feelings towards it , they are not differing in opinion about it at all and , generally speaking , there is absolutely no such thing as a difference of opinion upon moral questions . Westermarck replies to Moore by directly quoting him : Indeed , in another place Professor Moore himself admits that "a man 's feelings with regard to an action are not always clearly distinguished from his opinion as to whether it is right or wrong " and that "one and the same word is often used , sometimes to express the fact that a man has a feeling towards an action , and sometimes to express the fact that he has an opinion about it " It seems to me that this admission itself is sufficient to deprive his argument of all evidential value ( Westermarck , 1963

To sum up , it is important to say that Westermarck 's theory of moral emotion is one of significant arguments , which makes it possible to state that ethical judgements are subjective in their nature . At the same time we shouldn 't forget that it is relevant for the meanings of objective and subjective I operated with in the current essay . If we take into account the debate about the terms , it is not compulsory that any theory , be it of subjectivism or objectivism , will hold true in every context

Bibliography

HYPERLINK "http /www .questia .com /PM .qst ?a o d 6175198 " Ewing , A . C The Definition of Good . New York : Macmillan , 1947

LaFave , Sandra Thinking Critically About the "Subjective "Objective Distinction , 2004 . Available at HYPERLINK "http /instruct .westvalley .edu /lafave /subjective_objective .html http /instruct .westvalley .edu /lafave /subjective_objective .html accessed 15 April 2005

Sorley , W . R . Moral Values and the Idea of God . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1924

Westermarck , E .A Moral Emotion and Moral Judgment ' HYPERLINK "http /www .questia .com /PM .qst ?a o d 9111190 " Taylor , Paul W , ed . The Moral Judgment : Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics . Englewood Cliffs NJ : Prentice Hall , 1963 ...