The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor

The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor

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[Institution 's Name] The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor

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Over sixty years after the attack on Pearl Harbor , it is frustrating to see just how avoidable the devastation was "Never before have we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy . And perhaps never again will we have such a magnificent collection of sources at our disposal There are many reasons as to why , as Feldman put it "In purely tactical terms , Pearl Harbor was among the most successful military

operations of World War II . Crucial signals were lost in a sea of irrelevancies those that did make it to a commander 's desk were often interpreted poorly , and there was a gross underestimation of the Japanese , both in their abilities , and their audacity

It is easy now to distinguish between the important documents and the insignificant ones , but as Wohlsetter writes "before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings . Evidence suggesting a possible attack was lost in a sea of signals concerning what was then considered more likely events "In Washington , Pearl Harbor signals were competing with a vast number of signals from the European theatre . The far eastern signals were also arriving at a center of decision where they had to compete with the prevailing belief that an unprotected offensive force acts as a deterrent rather than a target . In Honolulu they were competing . with a large number of signals announcing Japanese intentions and preparations to attack Soviet Russia

Yet a possible attack on Pearl Harbor was not considered out of the question . The Martin-Bellinger report , presented in August 1941 by Colonel William Farthing to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii .predicted , with considerable accuracy , the shape a japans attack might take . But their proposed counter measures . were beyond American capability . The pearl harbor commanders chose instead to ignore these warnings and to concentrate on what seemed more defensible . threats What now may seem painfully obvious with the benefit of hindsight , at the time , appeared less likely than the plethora of other possibilities "There is a difference , then , between having a signal available somewhere in the heap of irrelevancies , and perceiving it as a warning and there is also a difference between perceiving it as a warning , and acting on getting action on it . These distinctions , simple as they are illuminate the obscurity shrouding this moment in history

There are a number of examples of poor interpretation of documents and events in1941 . In July Admiral Kimmel , Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet , was informed that Japanese consulates in countries neighboring Indo-China had been destroying codes . This was repeated in December , but Kimmel saw it as no cause for concern , he interpreted it as an attempt by the Japanese to conceal their codes form the Americans and their allies "This was a reasonable interpretation at the time , though not an especially keen one

Not every misinterpretation was based on naivety or incompetency . Some...