U.S. and its Foreign Policy on Iraq

p The legal restraint mostly spring from political . This is to say that domestic opposition to war in Iraq might be classified as being comprised of those yet to be persuaded and those opposing the president 's persuasion out of their own political views , thus , incapable of converting into proponents unless powerfull justification campaign The political restraints were mainly caused by the sheer number of those violently opposing and , as it is the principle of politics , to be overpowered by the simple majority . To shape a majority , Bush needed a system of

arguments pointed at substantiation the Iraqi leaders implication with terrorists . Having the publics justification on this important issue Bush would feel a great deal more secure with overcoming legal restraints . To shape the public thought seemed to be a main battlefield while legal justification was but tributary . On the way to public persuation Bush faced the following constraints

1 . Link between Hussein and 9 /11 and al Queda was far from being self-evident

Though two days after the terrorist attacks of September 11 ,2001 , a Time /CNN poll found that 78 percent of respondents thought that Saddam Hussein was involved with the attacks on the twin trade towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington (Pfiffner , 2004 , the government officials were much more restrained in their support to Bush implication . Further there might be observed a reverse process : after mobilizing the CIA reports government bureaucracy got increasingly committed to the idea , while the public , after recovering from first day histeria , and , especially , after the first injuries report in Afghanistan , got cooled and less enthsiastic . The question whether that link really existed was left behind letting the question how the iraq affair will benefit the cause of anti-terrorist war in

The official quoted President Bush as telling Condi Rice "I 'm tired of swatting flies " Bush , this official says , wanted an aggressive scheme to take bin Laden out (Isikoff , 2004 .It seems Bush wanted to hit the target big enough to retaliate for Twin towers . Whether those intentions where fair or did Bush just misled the nation puting it closer to the disastorous morrow might not be revenant question for the essay but what Bush certainly managed to do is circumvent the public mistrust to his claims

Bush appropriated neutral or cautious discourse when dealing with the connection between al Queda and Iraq and tried to emphasize the general Good , resulting from Hussein regime 's overthrow . The arguments about Iraq being a terrorist training base and the country leaders involvement with al Queda funding were general in character and contributed to the air of wickedness of the regime . It seems that Bush had strong personal prejudice against Hussein because the official rhetorics oscillated from one extremity into another : the administration based part of its argument on a claim that 9 /11 leader Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi official in Prague in April 2001 (Pfiffner , 2004 ) which made them say that Iraqi official 's connections with al Queda was...