Decision to drop the Atomic Bomb On Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki

THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOMIC BOMB ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOMIC BOMB ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI Page 1 of 4

Public opinion is still divided over the reasons and the necessity to utilize the newly developed atomic bomb against Japan at the close of World War II . The reason provided at the time was that it would save over one million lives , many of which would be Americans . Using that reasoning as a standalone argument

is simplistic . While it is true that there was some military justification for ending the war as soon as possible , there were other non-military reasons to deploy the weapons The decision to deploy atomic weapons against Japan was affected by military , economic , racial , and political arguments

Research into the fissionable material started in the 1930 's . Two Germans scientists , Hahn and Strassmann , succeeded in splitting the nucleus of a uranium atom in Berlin . News off this success arrived in the United States in the form of a lecture given by Nobel Laureate Niels Bohr . Experiments continued in the United States . In 1940 researchers created and Isolated neptunium and plutonium at Berkeley (Wheeler 17-19

Several scientists that had escaped from Nazi Germany attempted to warn the United States Government of the dangers of having the possibility of atomic weapons in the hands of Hitler . Einstein signed a letter written to President Roosevelt outlining the possibilities . Roosevelt responded by forming the Uranium Committee . By October of 1941 the project was receiving more than just token funding . The project acquired the now famous official name , The Manhattan Engineer District , or simply The Manhattan Project (Wheeler 21-22

The stage was set for the destruction of Japan in January of 1943 During a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in Casablanca Roosevelt stated The elimination of Germany , Japanese , and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by German , Italy , and Japan This single statement had severe ramifications (Maddox 6

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The unconditional surrender doctrine was criticized for allowing the propaganda machines in both Germany and Japan to promote the idea that the Allies meant not only to win the war , but to destroy their societies . This had the effect of bolstering there will to continue If the only possibility is unconditional surrender , then is nothing to lose by continuing the aggression and hoping for capitulation based on attrition . The unwillingness to negotiate a peace worked against those Germans who would have been encouraged to overthrow Hitler and the Japanese peace activists who may have ended the war earlier if assurances could have been obtained that the Japan could have retained the Emperor . Thus Japan 's capitulation in World War II was in all likelihood delayed by this policy (Wheeler 7-8

At Potsdam , the allies reaffirmed the unconditional surrender doctrine . Wording in the declaration that would have dealt with the issue of the emperor was deleted from the final document . By not addressing the disposition of Hirohito , the surrender demand had no chance of being accepted by the Japanese (Harper 104-107

The military argument for the necessity of the deployment of the atomic weapons was predicated on several assumptions . First , since the Japanese had already demonstrated a fanatical resistance and a willingness to fight to the last man , it could be argues that this would also be the case if an invasion of Japan was prosecuted . The Japanese had committed suicide on Saipan , had fought for over a month on Iwo Jima when there was obviously no chance of victory , and had delivered many kamikaze attacks (Harper 47-60 . The fire-bombing of Tokyo had killed over 100 ,000 Japanese with no apparent political effect (Harper 111

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Critics of this assessment are quick to note that Japan was already a beaten foe . Togo himself had openly suggested surrender (Kurzman 280 The Japanese ambassador to Moscow , Naotake Sato , met with the Soviet Foreign Minister on July 25th , 1945 . The ambassador requested the soviets to mediate a peace accord . Sato 's instructions from Tokyo were to make it clear that an unconditional surrender with no provision for the emperor was unacceptable , but that there would be no objection to a peace which wass based on the Atlantic Charter . Further , the position of Japan was that if the United Sates and Britain held out for surrender , then the Japanese would continue hostilities until the point of was trying to end hostilities and still be allowed to maintain their existence and honor (Harper 106-107

Stalin did not wish to receive the peace delegation . He wanted to extend the Soviet frontier to the east . Attlee and Truman agreed also not to receive the Japanese delegation . They were now committed to the Potsdam Declaration . Japan 's only choices were unconditional surrender (Harper 108

The dollars (Alperovitz 654 . It was felt by many involved with the project that there would be serious repercussions from Congress if the weapon was not deployed after so much money had been expended in its development . The concern was also for future money being allotted to continue the development of nuclear weapons . It was felt that this weapon system might aids in the effort to make Russia more manageable (Alperovitz 654

Historian Stanley Goldberg states the economic case succinctly . In his opinion , the military ands political establishment felt that the uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima justified the one billion dollar expense in isotope separation . The plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki

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was the result of a four hundred million dollar investment . It is possible that the rush to drop these weapons was largely fed by the fear that the war would be over prior to deployment (Alperovitz 654

Racial attitudes also played a role in the deployment . It is probable that the racist images that were published by the US government to spur war bond sales , keep workers on the job , and instill a sense of national pride had the desired effect of dehumanizing the Japanese people . There was a vicious anti-Japanese sentiment that was prevalent throughout all strata of the United States ' population groups . With that said though there is no evidence that racism was a major deciding factor in the decision . Racism may have played an unconscious role , though , in that leaders may not have felt any sympathy when the realization of the horror they were about to inflict dawned (Alperovitz 655

The decision to utilize these weapons was not based on any single criteria . It was a combination of several , including military political , economic , and racial . The desire to keep the soviets out of mainland Japan , the need for results based on the money that was expended . The need for retribution was cloaked in the desire for an unconditional surrender . All of these factors added up to the first time deployment of an atomic weapon of mass destruction Works Cited

Alperovitz , Gar . The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb . New York Alfred A . Knopf , 1995

Harper , Stephen . Miracle of Deliverance . New York : Stein and Day 1985

Kurzman , Dan . Day of the Bomb . New York : McGraw-Hill , 1986

Maddox , James . Weapons fro Victory . Columbia , Missouri : University of Missouri Press , 1995

Wheeler , Keith . The Fall of Japan . Chicago : Time-Life Books , 1983...