Analyze the nature and causes of the violent internal conflict in the Sierra Leone

Analysis of the Nature and causes of the Violent Internal Conflict in the Sierra Leone

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Analysis of the Nature and Causes of the

Violent Internal Conflict in the Sierra Leone

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War , qualitatively different and complex forms of conflict have been emerging throughout the world . These conflicts have been referred to by various scholars as "post modern conflicts " or "new wars . In contrast to "old wars , the term "new wars " suggests that these contemporary wars are substantially

different in form from their predecessors . Many of today 's conflicts are intra-state as opposed to interstate wars they are usually protracted , complex , and characterised by extreme violence and atrocity . During the past fifteen years there has also been a discernible increase in the number of new wars or postmodern conflicts , the majority taking place in the developing world .The proliferation of these new wars has resulted in increased attention to this issue within conflict research and policy-making circles . Much debate has taken place over the causes of these wars , and much attention has been paid to theoretical insights into the dynamics of these conflicts . This will investigate the nature and causes of the violent internal conflict in the Sierra Leone . It argues that specific underlying causes as follows : First , centralised and autocratic rule coupled with weak institutions second , patrimonialism eroding state institutions and the formal economy third , state decline , state implosion and conflict fourth , natural resources control . First theoretical underpinnings will be analysed . Then historical background and political situation will be introduced . And finally , possible explanations and causes along with some conclusive remarks will be presented

Theoretical Underpinnings

When Robert Kaplan published this now infamous article titled "The Coming Anarchy " in 1994 , many people subscribed to his view that anarchy was on the horizon (Kaplan 46-47 ) Kaplan 's article consisted of his interpretation of the conflict in Sierra Leone and his understanding of what was happening in the West African region as a whole . From this point of departure , Kaplan put forward an explanation of intra-state conflict based on anarchy , cultural clash and environmental scarcity Kaplan 's thesis reflected the theory of New Barbarism with an explanation for the nature of conflict both in Africa and other regions of the world , that conflict being what Kaplan and his followers saw as a sign of things to come

Paul Richards has disputed Kaplan 's New Barbarism thesis in his well-known book on Sierra Leone in 1996 . Outlining the three main tenets of the new barbarism thesis , environmental scarcity , cultural clash and the changing nature of warfare-to low intensity conflict , Richards examines and refutes the work of scholars including Kaplan , Homer-Dixon and Van Creveld . His work focuses specifically on the Sierra Leone conflict and suggests that environmental degradation in Sierra Leone is not extensive enough to be a cause or characteristic of the conflict nor , he posits , is ethnicity or cultural clash a reasonable depiction of the roots of violence in Sierra Leone

Richards follows a line of argument that suggests that intra state conflict has resulted from what he terms "a crisis of patrimonialism (Richards xvii . Patron client relations often underpin political systems . This is particularly discernable within the African context However , with the ending of the Cold War and the pressures of economic decline in many such states , patron client relations are becoming increasingly strained . As a result , competition for revenues and resources becomes more pronounced and violent . Other scholars , such as Chabal and Daloz have referred to this phenomenon as "neopatrimonialism (6

William Reno , writing on African states in Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone , has employed the term "shadow state " to describe this struggle for power and international recognition . In further work Warlord Politics and African States , on what he describes as "warlord politics " he suggests that rulers of patrimonial systems are able to bolster their positions by manipulating international recognition and state sovereignty to their advantage in to gain external revenues The pressures of globalisation have been assumed to have positive affect on the state , because they require that states employ strong and effective institutional practices in to gain external investment or support

Reno argues , however , that in many instances this is not the case . The international system does not prescribe any specific form of governance in for state sovereignty to be acquired (In spite of a recent emphasis on "good governance " by investors and international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank , personal rule systems have been able to benefit from lucrative commercial contracts with multinational companies and international aid and loans from global institutions regardless of their internal organisation (Reno 25-32 Duffield takes a similar line to Reno in his work on new wars and post modern conflict , suggesting that access to the international system via the recognition of sovereignty allows for non-state forms of political authority

New Wars have often been related to political economy and the availability of natural resources . Many theories on African conflict in particular have noted that certain countries with an abundance of natural resources such as diamonds and important mineral deposits such as bauxite or iron ore have also suffered long-standing , violent conflicts . Paul Collier of the World Bank Group has suggested that civil conflict may not be linked to the grievance of a population per se , but instead to the structural feasibility of war : Rebel forces in resource rich states are able to capitalise on revenues gained from natural resources and are thus able to finance their activities over an extended period of time . Collier defines this situation using the term 'predation "rebellion is unrelated to objective circumstances of grievance while being caused by the feasibility of predation (4

He asserts that those states that are dependent upon primary product export are more prone to predation and by extension to conflict because primary products are both "lootable " and taxable (Leonard and Straus 64 . Leonard and Straus have refined this term in their work on "enclave production " arguing that the structural causes of predation stem from weak state structures and enclave production (Leonard and Straus 12 The latter is not reliant on the institutional and political stability of the state for productivity . Enclave production and weak states then reinforce each other as enclave production allows for personal rule and personal rule interacts well with a weak state (Collier 4 . This type of political economy leaves states structurally vulnerable to conflict

Chris Allen has taken many of these points and extended them in his concept of "spoils politics " used in his work on endemic violence in Africa (Allen 375-379 ) Spoils politics "occurs when the primary goal of those competing for political power is self enrichment . Spoils politics can persist over extended periods of time , but will often lead to populist uprisings and /or state collapse (Allen 379 ) The characteristics seen within spoils politics systems according to Allen can include large scale corruption , severe lack of public welfare services , ethnic conflict where rivalry is promoted by groups vying for power , the monopolisation of power and the erosion of the means of control and coercion . Allen goes on to posit two outcomes for this kind of situation : state implosion or state explosion . The former tends to exhibit a process of slow erosion of central authority with some violence whereas the latter can lead to extremes of violence in the shape of armed warring factions , often headed by warlords

Sierra Leone : Historical Background

Sierra Leone is a small West African state situated between Liberia and Guinea on the West coast of Africa . Its population is approximately and its land mass is 72 ,325 square kilometres . The population in 2001 numbered some 4 .6 million (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Before the country 's independence from colonial rule in 1961 , Sierra Leone was a relatively peaceful country with a diverse population Sierra Leone 's modern history began with the settlement of freed slaves in the country 's capital Freetown from 1787 to 1850 . The resettlement of former slaves in Freetown marked the beginning of British colonial rule in Sierra Leone . The descendants of the freed slaves became known as "Krios " or Creoles and formed a specific group within society . This group was an educated class that formed around 2 to 3 per cent of the population . The Krio population became the dominant class , particularly in the Freetown area where they held jobs as doctors , teachers and occupied other skilled positions (Hirsh 23

When the colonial government made Freetown a Crown colony in 1808 , the Krio population began to gain positions in the civil service and government sectors . The indigenous peoples held a subordinate position relative to the Krios and tended to live outside of Freetown . The British colonisers let local indigenous chiefs rule the Freetown hinterland , but protected its trade routes through indirect rule and the eventual implementation of protectorate , which later became linked to the crown colony of Freetown (Hirsh 23-5 ) Throughout this period the country lived in relative peace the only major disturbance arose from indigenous resentment of British taxation laws , which affected them badly and resulted in an uprising against British rule in 1898 (Richards 38 ) Richards 38

This rebellion was soon quashed by the British , however , and relative peace resumed . In general throughout this period trade flourished in Sierra Leone and the country became a transit point for traders from all over the region . Nevertheless , development in the country was mainly directed towards Freetown and its immediate environs (Riley 5 . The state was increasingly centralised in this respect , with the provinces sharing very little of the wealth generated in the country , especially that wealth generated by the diamond and mineral deposits that were discovered in 1930 in Kono , a region in the eastern part of the country bing Liberia . The discovery of diamonds resulted in a shift in the country 's primary product base from forest products and tree crops to diamond mining . By the 1960s diamond production was a fundamental part of the country 's economy (Hirsh 26-7 ) Alluvial gold , Iron ore , bauxite and rutile also became important natural resources in the Sierra Leonean economy in the same period (Richards 40

During the next two decades the British colonisers faced cuts in their financial support from the British government in London . This resulted an extension of indirect rule outside of Freetown , where paramount chiefs where allowed to rule freely . A tributary system was set up to reduce costs to the British this consisted of a system by which miners in the hinterland received a share of their mined products in lieu of a salary (Hirsh 26 ) This use of local chiefs and the tributary system eventually led to a situation where the state held little control over activities outside the capital . Essentially , governance in Sierra Leone was built around a centralised but weak state , which did little to provide for those living outside the Freetown centre . Underdevelopment in the provincial areas meant that people capitalised on this system of indirect rule and a shadow economy , coupled with illicit mining , was able to proliferate

Independence from British rule came about in 1961 following the implementation of a decolonisation programme in 1951 . This programme saw the rise of Milton Margai , a provincial leader of an elite external to the Freetown . Margai became Chief Minister under British plans to democratise and decentralise power in Sierra Leone . He formed his own political party the Sierra Leonean Peoples Party (SLPP ) and ran for office . His leadership , however , did little to change the status quo inherited from the British . Some suggest that his time in power saw a period of genuine democracy in Sierra Leone , while others suggest that Margai 's rule saw the beginning of patronage politics based on the networks that had emerged from decentralised control of diamond mining areas (Hirsh ) William Reno for one suggests that the formation of a "shadow state " was beginning at this time

Upon the death of Milton Margai in 1964 , his brother Albert Margai assumed his position as party leader and took on the role of Prime Minister . Under Albert Margai the trend of patronage politics was clearly evident (Riley 4 ) Patronage networks bolstered the party 's support and increased its revenues . Support of local chiefs through patronage networks also kept any opposition at bay and became a specific strategy in SLPP politics . In addition , it has been suggested that the SLPP networks drew support from the Mende group from a hinterland population from the south of the country . This made the party more ethnically oriented in its patronage networks causing some amount of ethnic tension within the country (Hirsh 28 ) Increases in patronage revenues meant a decline in state revenues and public provisions . This led to a polarisation between those benefiting from the patronage networks (primarily those in power and those within the Freetown area and those who relied on the state for welfare (predominantly the provincial population ) This was a trend that was set to continue as the leadership in Sierra Leone changed hands

The SLPP 's main opposition at the time came for the All Peoples Congress (APC , formed by Siaka Stevens , a provincial trade union leader in the diamond mining areas of Marampa and Yenegema . The APC 's platform consisted of their appeals to grassroots support and the youth working in the diamond mining regions . The party is also said to have focused its attention on the Temne and Limba populations from the north of Sierra Leone , thus compounding the split between northern and southern based ethnic groups , in 1967 the APC narrowly won power from the SLPP in the general election (Hirsh 28-9

The results of this election were disputed by Albert Margai who encouraged a military coup in the wake of his fall from power . Failure to respect the election results undermined the future of democratic processes in Sierra Leone , which were already showing signs of strain with the emergence patronage politics . Civilian rule was finally restored in 1968 after several more coups and counter coups and Stevens finally took his place as the legitimate Prime Minister . Hirsh notes however , that this turn of events set a precedent for military coups which would plague Sierra Leone in years to come (Hirsh 29 ) Under Stevens ' rule , this decline in legitimacy continued as democratic leadership was abandoned under Siaka Stevens to be replaced by autocratic rule , corruption and political mismanagement that would span a thirty year period

Upon gaining office Stevens consolidated a system of patrimonial rule based on his accumulated patron-client networks . During his seventeen years in office , Stevens ensured that the multi party democracy set in place at the end of colonial rule was transformed into a one party system based on widespread corruption and patron-client networks . Upon gaining power , Stevens ' goal was to establish strong political authority . The weak institutions and the relatively poor economy left behind by British rule were an obstacle to this goal . The democratic system of governance was abandoned and a system of personal rule was gradually installed . In 1978 Stevens secured this personal rule system by officially declaring a one party state

Riley suggests that a "personality cult " developed around Stevens from this time and any form of competitive politics was destroyed (5 Stevens ' rule lasted from 1968 to 1985 . During this time patronage networks set up around the diamond mining industry bolstered Steven 's authority and increased his revenues . As Reno suggests .informal shadow state techniques , especially interventions to control the production and exchange of diamonds , strengthened Steven 's rule even as they stopped state institutions of resources and the means to serve the country 's people (80 ) Before Stevens came to power , the discovery of diamonds in Sierra Leone had led to revenues of over 200 million for the country 's formal economy . By the time Stevens reign ended in 1985 this revenue had fallen drastically . Figures from 1987 suggest that the diamond revenues passing through formal channels amounted to only 100 ,000 (Reno 116 ) The centralised state became a means to and ends for Stevens , allowing him to consolidate his power and revenues

In 1985 the aging Stevens retired from office for health reasons and installed his chosen successor , former head of the Sierra Leonean army Joseph Momoh as leader of the country . Momoh made various attempts to revitalise the failing Sierra Leonean economy , implementing structural adjustment programmes as stipulated by international creditors such as the IMF and World Bank . He also tried to replace many of Stevens cronies in to reduce corruption among government ranks (Riley 5 However , although Stevens had taken his retirement , he remained in the wings with his eye on government and power . He and his cronies continued to dominate formal and informal networks through the first years of Momoh 's rule , thus retaining their patronage networks and continuing to distribute much of the mineral wealth among themselves and their allies .With state revenues falling , Momoh became increasingly dependent on external help . Foreign aid became a major part of Sierra Leone 's income from the late 1980s . At a time when many African states were losing external funding as a result of the ending of Cold War hostilities Sierra Leone found its external assistance increasing . Bangura notes that Sierra Leone was never tangled in Cold War ties for the manipulation of external assistance and therefore did not suffer the same reversal of funding as many African states did at that time (Bangura 132-33 ) Nevertheless , the loss of revenue taken by rival patronage networks and the world slump in primary commodity prices at the time was taking its toll on the Sierra Leonean economy . Momoh was in an increasingly complicated situation

He needed to bolster his own networks in to bolster his power and finance public services (including the security services that protected his rule , and to retain loyal supporters . At the same time he needed to regain the trust of foreign creditors who were beginning to withdraw from the failing economy . In other words , Momoh needed to "pay off his supporters and run what remained of the formal state (Reno 117 ) Yet with a growing number of Stevens ' strongmen taking hold of the diamond trade and its revenues , and the threat of a coup should he try to remove them from their positions , Momoh began to realise he was in trouble . An attempted coup in 1987 confirmed his fears and highlighted for Momoh that his only choice was to regain control of the country 's diamond mining areas

By 1991 , the situation in Sierra Leone had vastly deteriorated . Human insecurity was high and Momoh 's policies had done little to end the corruption and patronage embedded in the Sierra Leonean system . In addition , the structural adjustment programmes undertaken throughout APC rule to try and revamp the economy had in actual fact exacerbated problems of underdevelopment and social exclusion and further eroded the weakened state (Zack-Williams 143 ) In late March 1991 a rebel group made up of dissident Sierra Leoneans , known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF , invaded Sierra Leone from neighbouring Liberia a country already in the midst of a civil war . As the group advanced through eastern Sierra Leone , they announced that their objective was to overthrow the Momoh government and return the country to multiparty democracy (Francis 107-8

The rebel group was headed by Foday Sankoh (a former corporal in the Sierra Leonean army ) and comprised of exiled Sierra Leoneans , and Liberian and Burkinabe mercenaries (Francis 107 ) Their invasion of Sierra Leone was aided by then Liberian President Charles Taylor . Taylor backed the rebels in to bolster his own objectives in the Liberian civil war , which included the creation of a Greater Liberia Economically viable areas of Sierra Leone were conquered by the RUF as they advanced across the country . The foreign exchange subsequently earned from trade in these areas was used in Liberia to support Charles Taylor 's rebel faction the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL (Reno 123

It has been suggested that Charles Taylor was also supportive of the RUF because of their opposition to Momoh . Taylor is said to have held a grudge against Momoh for his earlier role in providing a base for ECOWAS troops to deploy into Liberia in an attempt to bring down the NPFL and end the war there . Other explanations for Taylor 's support point to the fact that Taylor and RUF leader Sankoh had both had military training together in Libya and held similar radical views on overthrowing authoritarian regimes based on Libyan leader Colonel Gadaffi 's Green Book . Whatever the many reasons for Liberia 's involvement in Sierra Leone , any understanding of the conflict must take into account the Liberian connection and its role in , at the least , exacerbating the conflict

Momoh 's government fought the RUF with the help of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG ) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS However , the soldiers in the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA ) fighting to protect the government and dispel RUF rebels from their strongholds soon became disillusioned with their role in the war . Poorly paid and under resourced , many soldiers heavily resented the Momoh regime as well , hi 1992 mutiny among junior officers in the SLA resulted in a military coup that removed Momoh from power before the RUF could achieve the same goal (Francis 109

The coup was led by twenty seven year old army captain Valentine Strasser . He and his officers formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC ) and Strasser took his place at the head of a ruling junta . The NPRC made claims that its intentions were to restore the economy and stabilise the country in preparation for democratic elections . The NRPC was thus perceived by many in Sierra Leone to be their rescuer indeed this action won Valentine Strasser the nickname "the redeemer . Resources also became important to the NPRC and the claims about freeing Sierra Leone from corruption and poverty soon turned to rhetoric as the NPRC too became embroiled in the diamond trade in to honour their political claims . As Francis notes "the objectives of the NPRC were compromised by the economic and political opportunities provided by the war , whereby the constitutional army became involved in the criminal exploitation of the diamond resources (Francis 109

The war continued , but did not reach Freetown until 1995 . During this time state revenues collapsed almost completely . By 1995 state institutions were beginning to implode . The country was in turmoil Between 1991 and 1996 at least 25 ,000 people were killed in the fighting (Reno 126 ) Many more were wounded or maimed for life . The RUF became notorious for its violent tactics , in particular the amputation of limbs in to instil terror into their victims . During this period 1 .5 million people , nearly a third of the population , had become refugees (Francis 129 ) Newly elected in 1996 President Kabbah agreed to end the use of private security firms , which were seen as problematic by the international community because of their lack of sovereign status and private motivations . Keeping to this agreement , EO was asked to leave Sierra Leone upon completion if their contract in 1997 (Howe 315 At this time the peace agreement was beginning to fall apart before it had been fully implemented

On July 7th 1999 a third peace agreement to end the war , the Lome Agreement , was signed . Within the peace agreement , a stronger role for the UN observer mission was agreed , in to oversee implementation of the agreement . The UN mission was renamed UNAMSIL and a resolution was passed in the UN Security Council to allow for the deployment of an initial 6000 peacekeepers . This was later expanded to allow for up to 17 ,500 troops , the largest UN peacekeeping force ever deployed (Bones 59-60 ) Lome peace agreement was marred by a resurgence of violence in 2000 and in the May of that year British forces intervened in the civil war following the kidnapping of 500 UN peacekeepers by RUF rebels (United Nations ) Official peace was declared in Sierra Leone in January 2002 and elections were held in May of that year . President Kabbah won with a landslide victory that secured a majority government for the SLPP (BBC Online

Explaining War in Sierra Leone

A number of interpretations of the Sierra Leonean conflict have been offered over the years , including Kaplan 's thesis on new barbarism . As a direct challenge to Kaplan 's thesis , Paul Richards has suggested that the conflict in Sierra Leone had little to do with cultural clash environmental scarcity or a return to primordialism or anarchy . Instead he has suggested that the conflict in Sierra Leone resulted from a crisis of patrimonialism , social exclusion and the rational use of violence as a means by which to meet political objectives . He notes that the RUF had clear political objectives pertaining to social factors including poverty , and a lack of welfare provision and education facilities by the state , which led to the social exclusion of much of the provincial population (Richards xx

Richards ' main understanding of the war in Sierra Leone is provided in his argument that the country was suffering from a crisis of patrimonialism . This type of explanation has been particularly expounded as a cause of African conflict and has in many other cases of conflict seemed plausible as an explanation . By 'patrimonial crisis ' Richards means that loss of patrimonial revenues , usually caused by the withdrawal of foreign aid and slumps in the primary commodity markets led to popular unrest . Yet does this explanation really fit the case of Sierra Leone ? Bangura points out that if political leaders were the beneficiaries of the patronage networks rather than the population (including the RUF , then this view is difficult to accept (Bangura 130 ) If the population had largely been left without revenue , then any crisis of patrimonialism would still not affect them

However , as we have seen , aid flows to Sierra Leone were steady throughout this period and Sierra Leone did not suffer the same consequences from the end of the Cold War as many of their African neighbours did . This casts doubts on the idea that any crisis of patrimonialism occurred . In Sierra Leone then , this explanation for conflict is perhaps not the most convincing . Bangura 's counter argument however , appears to fit historical analysis more closely , suggesting that patrimonialism was in fact thriving at the expense of the formal state

The picture that emerges instead is that of a fiscal crisis [of the central state] , which affects the general state administration and provisioning , and the fortunes of those who depend upon the state for their livelihood . In other words , the poverty of the state is positively correlated with the affluence of the 'patrimonial ' groups . These groups as most Sierra Leoneans know , were insensitive to the plight of those who operated outside of the patrimonial networks (Bangura 133

Kaplan 's thesis aside , ethnicity has also been posited by some scholars as an explanation for conflict in Sierra Leone . However , many have also noted that the politicisation of ethnic identity has been a part of Sierra Leonean politics since long before the civil war began in 1991 and had not resulted in conflict . Moreover , as Riley noted in 1996 "whilst the RUF has exploited rural and ethnic grievances , it has also operated increasingly across the entire country . All ethnic identities have suffered (Riley 121-26 ) The salience of ethnicity seems evident within the Sierra Leonean context and should certainly be noted in any attempts to sustain peace in the country . However , it would appear that ethnicity per se has not to be an overriding source of conflict in Sierra Leone

Stephen Riley , also keen to dispel the new barbarism thesis suggested that two general positions on the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone have been put forward (Riley 4-11 ) One concentrates on the role of the central state and another looks to the role of rebel forces and rural society . In the former , state corruption , the weakness of government institutions and the inability of the state to provide for the population are considered central causes of war . In addition , the actions of international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are also thought to have played a large role in the decline of the economy and the state with Sierra Leone , leading eventually to conflict

Other arguments have suggested a more economic basis for the war positing the exploitation of natural resources , informal markets and patronage networks as major sources of violent conflict in Sierra Leone The struggle to control and exploit lucrative resources such as diamonds and alluvial gold has certainly been a strong factor in the Sierra Leone conflict . Leonard and Straus write that in the case of Sierra Leone civil conflict was able to persist because of enclave production : the mining of natural resources , which did not rely on state legitimacy and control to produce profits and revenues to support the various factions (Leonard and Straus 104 ) Resources can and do act to fuel and sustain conflicts , however , is financial incentive alone a reason for conflict Many analyses have suggested that greed has been at the source of conflict in Sierra Leone . However , such analyses may be too simplistic

Resources can certainly act as a catalyst for conflict nevertheless there are many indicators to suggest that economic benefit alone is not the long-term goal of conflict . For example , in spite of controlling much of the country 's diamond wealth , the RUF and in particular RUF leader Foday Sankoh were not satisfied enough with their wealth to implement peace agreements during the 1990s , and Sankoh was particularly keen to establish a right to the vice presidency within the Abidjan Agreement . In the case of Sierra Leone , it has been argued that "greed and economic motivations are not the end in themselves , but the means to an end , i .e . the attainment of state power (Francis 117

The struggle for state power however may not represent the struggle for a political alternative . With state power comes the ability to control revenues at both domestic and international levels . Power can allow for personal aggrandisement through the control of patron client networks and warlord politics , hi similar vein , William Reno offers an understanding of the Sierra Leone conflict based on the rise of a "shadow state , which allows for the emergence of rulers who can gain control of markets , both formal and informal , for their financial benefits . This is certainly evident in Sierra Leone with its history of patronage and the struggle between all factions in the war to control or gain from natural resource markets

Conclusion

Sierra Leone 's history is long and complex . However , many of these complexities and details from the past offer an understanding of the underpinnings of the crisis in Sierra Leone as well as explaining how the war became so protracted . It is clear form the history detailed above , that the role of the state and the actions of politcal leaders are important to the context of the war . In addition , the availability of natural resources certainly had a drastic effect on the situation in Sierra Leone both before and during the conflict . Other factors too played an important part in shaping events in Sierra Leone

The role of regional and international actors , both state and non state must be taken into account in any explanation of events . Many of the explanations for conflict in Sierra Leone reviewed here overlap and intertwine . In other words the causal factors suggested by individual scholars appear to be inextricably linked to other socio-economic and political factors . What is clear from all the explanations outlined above is that no one variable is necessary or sufficient enough to account for the civil war . Instead , a multiplicity of underlying and triggering factors combined to produce a protracted and horrifically violent civil war

In the case of Sierra Leone , many of the underlying factors that led to war seem to be historical , linked to colonial inheritance . A weak central state characterised by ineffective rule in rural areas and combined with a tradition of patron client relations resulted in poor institutional facilities and mass underdevelopment within the country This in turn allowed spheres of patron client networks to persist and further develop and a state system of patrimonial rule to grow , thus replacing any semblance of democracy in place at independence in 1961 The availability of natural resources acted as fuel for these patron client networks and furthered the socio-economic decay and underdevelopment that excluded much of the population from prosperity and welfare . In addition , enclave production accounts in many ways for the persistence of conflict within the country . The war was able to continue because the funds to do so were available

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